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Abstract
We formulate a stochastic game of mean field type where the agents
solve optimal stopping problems and interact through the proportion
of players that have already stopped. Working with a continuum of
agents, typical equilibria become functions of the common noise that
all agents are exposed to, whereas idiosyncratic randomness can be
eliminated by an Exact Law of Large Numbers. Under a structural
monotonicity assumption, we can identify equilibria with solutions of a
simple equation involving the distribution function of the idiosyncratic
noise. Solvable examples allow us to gain insight into the uniqueness
of equilibria and the dynamics in the population.
Keywords Mean Field Game; Optimal Stopping; Bank-Run
AMS 2010 Subject Classification 91A13; 60G40; 91A15; 91A55
1 Introduction
Stochastic games with a large number n of players are notoriously intractable.
Mean field games were introduced by Lasry and Lions [24, 25, 26] and Huang,
Malhamé, and Caines [19, 20] to study Nash equilibria in the limiting regime
where n tends to infinity and the players interact symmetrically through the
empirical distribution of the private states of all players. Given such a dis-
tribution µ, each player typically solves a standard control problem; that
is, controls a diffusion while paying some cost of effort. On the other hand,
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the reward (and possibly the diffusion) depend on µ, which is in turn de-
termined by the actions of all agents. In the analytic theory, such a system
is described by a coupled system of nonlinear partial differential equations
(PDEs): a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation describes the optimal control
problem when µ is given, and a Kolmogorov-type equation describes the evo-
lution of µ over time as a result of the optimal controls. One of the major
difficulties is that the former equation naturally starts from a terminal con-
dition and runs backward in time, whereas the latter runs forward to ensure
the consistency of µ; we refer to [6, 17] for background. In a probabilistic ver-
sion of the theory, the stochastic maximum principle is used and the system
of PDEs is replaced by a coupled forward-backward stochastic differential
equation; cf. [4, 7, 8, 9]. In the simplest case, the agents are exposed to id-
iosyncratic i.i.d. noise (essentially, an independent Brownian motion for each
diffusion equation) and thus the equilibria are formulated as deterministic.
More recently, the presence of an additional common noise and stochastic
equilibria have received considerable attention; see [10, 13, 16, 22, 28]. A
wide range of applications from production models to population dynamics
have emerged over the last decade, several of them summarized in [18]; see
also [12] for a recent model of systemic risk and [13] for price impact in
finance.
While mean field games were introduced as a tractable model for a large
stochastic game, they are still rather complex. To the best of our knowledge,
the only case that can be solved explicitly is linear-quadratic control (linear
dynamics, quadratic cost). This situation has been studied in detail; see
[2, 3, 5, 12]. In other cases, one generally has to settle for an abstract
description by a coupled system of nonlinear equations.
The main aim of the present paper is to formulate a tractable game of
mean field type where the properties of equilibria can be understood some-
what more directly. In our case, the agents will be solving optimal stopping
problems rather than diffusion control1. While in a standard mean field
game the (spatial) location of the players matters, the state space here be-
comes binary: each player either has stopped or is still in the game, and the
interaction occurs through the number of players that have already stopped.
This structure seems appealing due to its simple interpretation and a wide
range of possible applications from bank-run models to traffic optimization.
1 The possible interest of such a game was first pointed out to the author by René
Carmona. Section 2 of [18] can be seen as a predecessor, at least in spirit: in a toy
example called “When Does the Meeting Start?” the agents indirectly control their arrival
times at a prespecified location.
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On the other hand, it produces an inherent discontinuity in the game: as
is well-known in economics (e.g., [14, 27]), games of optimal timing may
easily degenerate in that all players stop at the same time. Thus, one of
the challenges is to produce a class of models where typical equilibria are
non-trivial.
Specifically, we shall study a continuous-time stochastic game with a
continuum of players. In equilibrium, each agent i will be solving an optimal
stopping problem of the form
sup
τ
E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
rs ds
)
1{θ>τ}∪{θ=∞}
]
;
it has two competing forces. The process r can be interpreted as a reward
or interest rate that is accrued as long as the agent does not stop, thus
incentivizing the agent to stay in the game. On the other hand, there is a
random time θ of default (of the interest-paying institution): the agent will
lose everything if θ happens before she leaves the game. While the default
happens as a “surprise” to the agent, the distribution of θ is governed by an
intensity process γi that is known to the agent: the larger γi, the more likely
it is that default happens soon. More precisely, θ is modeled as the first jump
time of a Cox process with intensity γi. This leads to a tractable solution of
the single-agent optimal stopping problem—we are taking inspiration from
the finance literature (e.g., [23, Chapter 5]) where it is well-known that a
defaultable bond in a similar setting will be priced just like a non-defaultable
one, but with an adjusted interest rate r − γi.
The agents are heterogeneous in their views on the distribution of the
default—we think of the intensity γi as depending on the subjective proba-
bility used by agent i. As a result, the players face different optimal stopping
problems and may stop at different times. The agents’ views on the default
intensity will also be influenced by how many players have already stopped;
more precisely, the proportion ρt ∈ [0, 1] of players that have left the game
by time t. This process is observed by all agents and creates an interaction
of mean field type: if ρt is larger, the intensity of any player will also be
larger, meaning that the perceived default will happen sooner. As in bank-
run models, this represents that the default of the institution is more likely
if more customers have abandoned ship.
While we defer the general formulation of the setting to Section 5, a
typical model may postulate that γi is of the form
γit = Xt + Y
i
t + cρt. (1.1)
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Here X plays the role of a common noise (the same for all agents) whereas Y i
is an idiosyncratic noise that will be i.i.d. within the population. Depending
on the application, one may interpret X and Y i as public and private signals,
respectively, or see their sum as a noisy observation of the true signal X.
Moreover, the constant c ≥ 0 governs the strength of interaction; that is, how
much the agents’ views are affected by ρt. Suppose that τ
i is the stopping
time chosen by agent i, and that the continuum of agents is represented by
an atomless probability space (I,I, λ). Then,
ρt(ω) = λ{i : τ
i(ω) ≤ t} (1.2)
is the “proportion” of players that have stopped prior to time t. This can
also be seen as the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) at time t of the
empirical measure that describes the evolution of the system on I × {0, 1},
recording for each agent i whether stopping has occurred (1) or not (0).
If we start with a given process ρ, the intensities γi of the agents are
determined. Let us suppose that the associated optimal stopping problems
have solutions (τ i)i∈I . Tacitly assuming a suitable measurability, we may
then consider the process λ{i : τ i(ω) ≤ t}, and if it satisfies (1.2), we shall
say that ρ and (τ i)i∈I form an equilibrium. Since we are working with a
continuum of players, the decision of a single agent does not influence ρ, and
hence this notion corresponds to a Nash equilibrium: given the strategies of
the other players, each player is behaving optimally.
Our main result (Theorem 5.1) relates equilibria ρt to the solution of a
finite-dimensional equation. For instance, in the case of (1.1), it reads
1− u = Ft(r − x− cu), u ∈ [0, 1], (1.3)
where Ft is the c.d.f. of the idiosyncratic noise Yt and r is the (constant)
interest rate. If ρ(t, x) is the (maximal) solution u at time t and Xt is the
common noise, then ρ(t,Xt) describes an equilibrium, and a converse is also
established. This simple equation allows us to understand the structure and
multiplicity of equilibria in some detail. Two ingredients are important for
the tractability of our setting. On the one hand, we use an Exact Law
of Large Numbers to completely eliminate idiosyncratic randomness (the
associated mathematical setup will be discussed later on). This idea and its
many incarnations are well-known in economics; see [1, 15, 21, 31] to cite but
a few examples. On the other hand, we impose the structural assumption
that γi − r is increasing, and as we shall see, that leads to a simple solution
of the single-agent problem. In comparison to the coupled forward-backward
system of equations that is common in the literature on mean field games, one
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may say that the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman part becomes irrelevant because
we know the solution of the single-agent problem (given ρ) in feedback form,
whereas our equation represents the Kolmogorov forward equation—indeed,
we may take time derivatives in (1.3) to find a PDE for ρ, or an ODE in the
case without common noise.
While the main aim of the present paper is to formulate a tractable ex-
ample of a mean field game of optimal stopping, there are important aspects
that are not discussed. Three major questions are the passage to the limit
from a game with n players, what happens when the monotonicity condition
is dropped, and the analysis of applications. Recent results on these can be
found in [11], and we would like to emphasize that much of that work was
carried out in parallel or before ours. In particular, it is shown that in our
model of Section 5.1, equilibrium strategies from the continuum formulation
are ε-equilibrium strategies in an n-player game with large n. Moreover, a
general framework for mean field games of optimal stopping (or “timing”) is
introduced and analyzed, and applications to bank run models are discussed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we describe the game more rigorously and analyze the single-player problem
in detail, whereas Section 3 introduces the mathematical setting that allows
for an Exact Law of Large Numbers. Section 4 analyzes an insightful toy
model without common noise; we discuss examples of (non-)uniqueness and
the impact of noise and strength of interaction on the continuity of equilibria
in time. Finally, Section 5 treats the general model with common noise.
2 Description of the Game
Let (I,I, λ) be a probability space; each i ∈ I will correspond to an agent.
Moreover, let (Ω,F , P ) be another probability space, to be used as the sam-
ple space. We suppose that (Ω,F , P ) is equipped with right-continuous
filtrations Gi = (Git)t∈R+ and an exponentially distributed random variable
E which is independent of Gi for all i ∈ I. We interpret Gi as the in-
formation available to agent i. Finally, let r be a real-valued and locally
integrable process (i.e., Lebesgue-integrable on bounded intervals) which is
G
i-progressively measurable for all i ∈ I; that is, observed by all agents.
2.1 Single-Agent Problem
We first consider the optimization problem for a fixed agent i ∈ I and we de-
note by T i the set of all Gi-stopping times. Let γi ≥ 0 be a Gi-progressively
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measurable process which is locally integrable and consider the random time
θi = inf
{
t :
∫ t
0
γis ds = E
}
.
One may think of θi as the first jump time of a Cox process with intensity γi.
The default time θi depends on i, which will allow us to write all optimal
stopping problems under a common probability measure P . Alternately, we
could deal with a single random time on a canonical space and endow the
agents with subjective probabilities P i. We have found the former solution
easier to write, and they are equivalent in that the agents’ decisions (and
the equilibria) only depend on the distribution of the intensity. For technical
reasons, we shall assume that
r+ is integrable on [0,∞), P -a.s.,
or
inf{t : γit − rt ≥ 0} <∞, P -a.s.

 (2.1)
See also Remark 2.2 below for the necessity of such a condition. We then
have the following result on the single-agent problem.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that γi − r is increasing 2 and (2.1) holds. Then,
τ i := inf{t : γit − rt ≥ 0} ∈ T
i
is a solution of the optimal stopping problem 3
sup
τ∈T i
E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
rs ds
)
1{θi>τ}∪{θi=∞}
]
. (2.2)
If the value of (2.2) is finite, then τ i is minimal among all solutions, and if,
in addition, γi − r is strictly increasing, then τ i is the unique solution.
Proof. Due to the increase of γi − r and the right-continuity of Gi, the
right limit process ζ of γi − r exists and is Gi-progressively measurable. As
{τ i ≤ t} = {ζt ≥ 0} ∈ G
i
t , we have τ
i ∈ T i.
Let τ ∈ T i be such that r+ is integrable on [0, τ), P -a.s. Using also the
independence of E and Gi, we have
P
[
{θi > τ} ∪ {θi =∞}
∣∣∣∣Giτ
]
= P
[ ∫ τ
0
γis ds < E
∣∣∣∣Giτ
]
= E
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
γis ds
)∣∣∣∣Giτ
]
.
2Increase is to be understood in the non-strict sense throughout the paper.
3 We use the convention that
∫
∞
0
rs ds := −∞ if
∫
∞
0
r+s ds =
∫
∞
0
r−s ds =∞.
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Hence,
E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
rs ds
)
1{θi>τ}∪{θi=∞}
∣∣∣∣Giτ
]
= E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
(rs − γ
i
s) ds
)∣∣∣∣Giτ
]
and finally
E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
rs ds
)
1{θi>τ}∪{θi=∞}
]
= E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
(rs − γ
i
s) ds
)]
. (2.3)
If we are in the first case of (2.1), our integrability condition holds for all
τ ∈ T i and as r − γi is decreasing, the representation on the right-hand
side shows that τ i is optimal. In the second case of (2.1), as r is locally
integrable, we still have (2.3) for every finite-valued τ ∈ T i, and we deduce
that τ i is optimal among all those stopping times. If τ is a general stopping
time and N ∈ N, Fatou’s lemma and that optimality yield
E
[
exp
(∫ τ
0
rs ds
)
1{θi>τ}∪{θi=∞}
]
≤ lim inf
N→∞
E
[
exp
(∫ τ∧N
0
rs ds
)
1θi>τ∧N
]
≤ E
[
exp
(∫ τ i
0
rs ds
)
1θi>τ i
]
,
so that τ i is in fact optimal among all stopping times. The remaining asser-
tions can also be inferred from (2.3).
We see from the proof of Lemma 2.1 how the increase of γi − r leads to
a simple solution of the optimal stopping problem and that will contribute
greatly to the tractability of equilibria. We have little else to say in defense
of that condition.
Remark 2.2. As usual in infinite-horizon stopping problems, an integrabil-
ity assumption is necessary to ensure existence of an optimal stopping time.
In particular, if r > γi > 0 are constant, then τ i = ∞ which is clearly not
optimal as then P ({θi > τ i} ∪ {θi = ∞}) = 0. If we consider the same
problem with a horizon T ∈ (0,∞), no extra assumption is necessary.
Remark 2.3. In Lemma 2.1 and the remainder of this paper, we use strict
monotonicity of γi − r as a simple sufficient condition for the uniqueness
of τ i. In specific cases one may want to use a sharper condition; for instance,
discrete-time problems can be embedded in our results by using piecewise
constant processes, but then the notion of strict monotonicity needs to be
adapted.
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2.2 Interaction
While the ith agent chooses to stop at τ i ∈ T i, the agents will interact
through the “proportion” of agents that have already stopped. Indeed, we
shall specify γi as a functional depending on a process ρ, and then an equi-
librium will be a collection of stopping times τ i ∈ T i which solve (2.2) for
λ-almost all i ∈ I and such that
ρt = λ{i : τ
i ≤ t}. (2.4)
When λ is atomless, the decision of a single agent does not influence this
quantity and hence we indeed have a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, the process ρ
will necessarily be increasing and [0, 1]-valued. Moreover, we think of ρ as
being observed by all agents, so ρ will be Gi-adapted for all i.
In (2.4), we are tacitly assuming that the set on the right-hand side is I-
measurable P -a.s., which is highly nontrivial for a continuum of i.i.d. random
variables. The setup that can guarantee this is discussed in the next section.
Before that, however, let us illustrate the concepts introduced thus far by a
very simple example where the agents do not use any signals except ρ.
Example 2.4 (Sunspot). (i) Let λ be the Lebesgue measure on I = [0, 1],
let r > 0 be constant and let X be a right-continuous, increasing process on
(Ω,F , P ), progressively measurable for the common, right-continuous filtra-
tion Gi = G (i.e., the same for all agents) and such that X∞ > 1. Suppose
agent i ∈ [0, 1] believes in the intensity
γit = (r − i+ ρt) ∨ 0.
Thus, i acts as an index of “optimism” or “risk tolerance”—agents with higher
index believe that θi will happen later. We claim that
ρt = (Xt ∧ 1) ∨ 0
yields an equilibrium. Indeed, the optimal stopping times are then given by
τ i = inf{t : γit − r ≥ 0} = inf{t : ρt = i} = inf{t : Xt ≥ i}
and that results in
λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Xt ≥ i} = (Xt ∧ 1) ∨ 0 = ρt;
note that the second condition of (2.1) is satisfied.
For instance, the choice Xt = t gives rise to ρt = t∧1 and τ
i = i, showing
that the agents stop at deterministic times which are uniformly distributed
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over the time interval [0, 1]. If X0 is strictly positive, we see that some of
the agents stop instantaneously at t = 0, whereas if X0 is strictly negative,
it will take a while before any agents stop.
(ii) A similar equilibrium exists in a finite player game. Let n ∈ N and
let λ be the normalized counting measure on I = {1/n, 2/n, . . . , 1}; this
corresponds to n equally weighted agents. In the same setting as in (i), an
equilibrium is described by τ i = inf{t : Xt ≥ i} and
ρt = ⌊(Xt ∧ 1) ∨ 0⌋,
where ⌊x⌋ := max{s ∈ I : s ≤ x}.
Remark 2.5. (i) In the preceding example, the process X is not part of the
functional form of γi; essentially, any process X gives rise to an equilibrium.
The interpretation is that if all agents agree that some commonly observed
signal X is relevant, it indeed becomes relevant—the name “sunspot equi-
librium” suggests itself. We shall see in Example 4.3 that this situation is a
degenerate limit of a model where uniqueness is the typical case.
(ii) If all agents are perfectly identical, the problem will degenerate since
they will (typically) all stop at the same time. Thus, in the above example,
the agents have been made heterogeneous by varying the risk tolerance. This
is not necessary when the agents are already heterogeneous due to private
signals, as in the later sections.
3 Mathematical Setting and Exact Law of Large
Numbers
In this section, we introduce the setting to accommodate a continuum of
agents and their private signals. Let (I,I, λ) be an atomless (hence, un-
countable) probability space and let (Ω,F , P ) be another probability space.
Definition 3.1. A family (fi)i∈I of random variables on (Ω,F , P ) is essen-
tially pairwise independent if for λ-almost all i ∈ I, fi is independent of fj
for λ-almost all j ∈ I. The family is essentially pairwise i.i.d. if, in addition,
all fi have the same distribution. Analogously, for a σ-field C ⊆ F , the
family (fi)i∈I is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, if for
λ-almost all i ∈ I, fi is conditionally independent of fj given C for λ-almost
all j ∈ I.
In what follows, we need to work on a probability space that is larger
than the usual product4 (I × Ω,I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ), because the latter does not
4 Here and below, we use the convention that the product σ-field I ⊗ F is completed.
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support relevant families of i.i.d. random variables. More precisely, we have
the following fact; see, e.g., [31, Proposition 2.1].
Remark 3.2. If f : I × Ω → R is an I ⊗ F-measurable function such that
f(i, ·), i ∈ I are essentially pairwise i.i.d., then f is constant λ⊗ P -a.s.
Following [31], we say that a probability space (I×Ω,Σ, µ) is an extension
of the product (I ×Ω,I ⊗F , λ⊗P ) if Σ contains I ⊗F and the restriction
of µ to I ⊗ F coincides with λ⊗ P . It is a Fubini extension if, in addition,
any µ-integrable5 function f : I × Ω → R satisfies the assertion of Fubini’s
theorem6; that is,
(i) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the function f(i, ·) is P -integrable,
(ii) for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, the function f(·, ω) λ-integrable,
(iii) i 7→
∫
f(i, ·) dP is λ-integrable, ω 7→
∫
(·, ω) dλ is P -integrable, and∫
f dµ =
∫∫
f(i, ω)P (dω)λ(di) =
∫∫
f(i, ω)λ(di)P (dω).
Let (I × Ω,Σ, µ) be a Fubini extension of (I × Ω,I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ). Then,
essentially pairwise independent families satisfy an exact version of the Law
of Large Numbers. The simplest version runs as follows—more generally, an
exact version of the Glivenko–Cantelli Theorem holds; cf. [31, Corollary 2.9].
Proposition 3.3 (Exact Law of Large Numbers). Let f : I × Ω → R be
µ-integrable. If f(i, ·), i ∈ I are essentially pairwise i.i.d. with a distribution
having mean m, then
∫
f(·, ω) dλ = m for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
We shall also need a conditional version as provided by [30, Corollary 2].
Proposition 3.4 (Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers). Let C ⊆ F
be a countably generated σ-field and let f : I × Ω → R be µ-integrable. If
f(i, ·), i ∈ I are essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, then∫
f(·, ω) dλ =
∫
Eµ[f |I ⊗ C](·, ω) dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
In view of Remark 3.2, it is not obvious that the preceding propositions
are not vacuous—that is guaranteed by the next two results.
The space (I×Ω,Σ, µ) is called rich if there exists a Σ-measurable func-
tion f : I × Ω→ R such that f(i, ·), i ∈ I are essentially pairwise i.i.d. with
5 That is, f is measurable for the µ-completion of Σ and
∫
|f | dµ <∞.
6 Since Σ may be strictly larger than I ⊗ F , this is not automatic.
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a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Like an atomless probability space supports
random variables with any given distribution, a rich Fubini extension sup-
ports essentially pairwise i.i.d. families with any given distribution; cf. [31,
Corollary 5.4].
Lemma 3.5. Let (I × Ω,Σ, µ) be a rich Fubini extension of (I × Ω,I ⊗
F , λ ⊗ P ), let S be a Polish space and let ν be a Borel probability measure
on S. There exists a Σ-measurable function f : I × Ω→ S such that f(i, ·),
i ∈ I are essentially pairwise independent and f(i, ·) has distribution ν for
all i ∈ I.
Lemma 3.6. There exist atomless probability spaces (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P )
such that (I ×Ω,I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P ) admits a rich Fubini extension.
This is part of the assertion of [31, Proposition 5.6] which also shows
that one can take I = [0, 1] and Ω = R[0,1]. The main result of [32] shows
that, in addition, one can take λ to be an extension of the Lebesgue measure
(but not the Lebesgue measure itself). A different construction, avoiding
nonstandard analysis, is presented in [29].
4 A Toy Model
In this section, we discuss a simple setting where the agents’ signals are
i.i.d.; that is, pure idiosyncratic noise. While not suitable for most appli-
cations, this will allow us to explain the effect of the Exact Law of Large
Numbers in our model and to discuss some finer questions of uniqueness and
nondegeneracy without too many distractions.
Consider the setup introduced in Section 2 with atomless probability
spaces (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ), and let (I × Ω,Σ, µ) be a Fubini extension
of their product. For each i ∈ I, let Y i ≥ 0 be a right-continuous, increas-
ing, Gi-progressively measurable process. We assume that for each t ≥ 0,
(i, ω) 7→ Y it (ω) is Σ-measurable and that Y
i
t , i ∈ I are essentially pairwise
i.i.d. Moreover, we assume that the distribution of Y it has no atoms; that is,
its c.d.f. y 7→ Ft(y) := P{Y
i
t ≤ y} is continuous.
Proposition 4.1. Let r ∈ R and c ∈ R+. The equation
1− u = Ft(r − cu), u ∈ [0, 1] (4.1)
has a maximal solution ρ(t) ∈ [0, 1] for every t ≥ 0, and t 7→ ρ(t) is right-
continuous. Define also
γit = Y
i
t + cρ(t), τ
i = inf{t : Y it + cρ(t) = r},
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and assume that (2.1) is satisfied for all i.
(i) Then, ρ and (τ i)i∈I define an equilibrium: τ
i ∈ T i is an optimal
stopping time for agent i, the mapping (i, ω) 7→ τ i(ω) is Σ-measurable, and
λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = ρ(t) P -a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
(ii) Conversely, let ρ¯ be a right-continuous function corresponding to an
equilibrium. If γi is strictly increasing for all i, then ρ¯(t) is a solution of (4.1)
for every t ≥ 0.
Sketch of Proof. The proposition is a special case of Theorem 5.1 that will
be proved later on, so we shall only explain the most important steps.
(a) We first argue that ρ is well-defined, increasing and right-continuous.
Let us consider, for a right-continuous and increasing function F : R→ [0, 1],
the zeros of
G(u) := F (r − cu)− 1 + u, u ∈ [0, 1].
We have G(0) = F (r) − 1 ≤ 0 and G(1) = F (r − c) ≥ 0. Moreover, G is
left-continuous and its jumps satisfy ∆G ≤ 0. Thus, G must have at least
one zero in [0, 1]. If un ↑ u is a maximizing sequence of zeros in [0, 1], then
G(u) = 0 by left-continuity and u is the maximal zero.
Next, write Gt(u) := Ft(r − cu) − 1 + u and let ρ(t) be the maximal
zero for each t ≥ 0. The increase and the right-continuity of t 7→ ρ(t) can
be inferred from the increase of Y and the right-continuity of Y and the
continuity of y 7→ Ft(y), respectively—we defer the details.
(b) Next, we verify that ρ and (τ i)i∈I determine an equilibrium. It
follows from (a) that γi = Y i+ cρ is increasing and right-continuous; hence,
Lemma 2.1 yields that τ i ∈ T i is an optimal stopping time for all i ∈ I and
that {(i, ω) : τ i(ω) ≤ t} = {(i, ω) : Y it (ω) + cρ(t) ≥ r} ∈ Σ. Using the
Exact Law of Large Numbers of Proposition 3.3, the continuity of Ft and
the definition of ρ(t), we have P -a.s. that
ρ¯(t) := λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Y it + cρ(t) ≥ r}
=
∫
P{Y it + cρ(t) ≥ r}λ(di) = 1− Ft(r − cρ(t)) = ρ(t)
for all t ≥ 0.
(c) Let ρ¯ : R+ → R be a right-continuous function corresponding to an
equilibrium; that is, ρ¯(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t} for some optimal τ i ∈ T i, i ∈ I.
Then ρ¯ is clearly increasing and [0, 1]-valued. Due to the strict increase of γi,
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we know from Lemma 2.1 that τ i = inf{t : γit ≥ r}. Thus,
ρ¯(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Y it + cρ¯(t) ≥ r}
=
∫
P{Y it + cρ¯(t) ≥ r}λ(di) = 1− Ft(r − cρ¯(t));
that is, ρ¯(t) is a solution of (4.1) for all t ≥ 0.
We begin our discussion with some observations about uniqueness.
Remark 4.2. (i) Equation (4.1) may have more than one solution; cf. Exam-
ple 4.4. If t 7→ ρ(t) is any right-continuous, increasing solution of (4.1), not
necessarily maximal, then ρ induces an equilibrium, by the same arguments
as in the above proof of Proposition 4.1.
(ii) Equation (4.1) also has a minimal solution, and it is automatically
increasing in t. However, it is not necessarily right-continuous; see also
Example 4.3 (iii) below. Instead, it is left-continuous provided that Y is. If
the solution is unique and Y is continuous, the solution is both minimal and
maximal, and therefore continuous.
Next, we analyze a special case of Proposition 4.1 that is explicitly
solvable and sheds some light on the impact of the constant c ≥ 0 that
parametrizes the strength of interaction. One intuition is that if the inter-
action between the agents is too strong, some agents’ stopping will lead to
a domino effect where all others end up stopping immediately after.
Example 4.3. Let r ≥ 1 and let U i, i ∈ I be essentially pairwise i.i.d. with
a uniform distribution on [r− 1, r]. Moreover, let a : R+ → R+ be a strictly
increasing, right-continuous function with a(0) = 0 and a(∞) > 1—the
latter will ensure that (2.1) holds. We then consider the strictly increasing
process
Y it = U
i + a(t)
and note that Ft(y) = F (1+y−a(t)−r), where F is the c.d.f. of the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Thus, Equation (4.1) becomes
1− u = F (1− cu− a(t)), u ∈ [0, 1]. (4.2)
(i) No interaction, c = 0. Clearly, the unique solution is ρ(t) = a(t) ∧ 1,
and this is the unique equilibrium by the last part of Proposition 4.1.
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(ii) Moderate interaction, c ∈ (0, 1). Then, (4.2) is easily seen to have a
unique solution ρ(t) ∈ [0, 1]; namely,
ρ(t) = [(1− c)−1a(t)] ∧ 1,
and this is the unique equilibrium. In particular, the population of
stopped agents evolves in a nondegenerate, continuous fashion for c ∈
(0, 1). The larger the interaction coefficient c, the more agents stop
earlier.
(iii) Critical interaction, c = 1. Using that a(t) > 0 for t > 0, we can check
that ρ(t) = 1 is the unique solution of (4.2) for t > 0. Thus, ρ ≡ 1 is
the unique right-continuous solution; that is, all agents stop at t = 0.
This is also the unique right-continuous equilibrium.
It is worth noting that any u ∈ [0, 1] is a solution of (4.2) for t = 0;
recall that a(0) = 0. Intuitively speaking, solutions ρ(t) = u1{0} +
1(0,∞) that are not right-continuous correspond to equilibria where
a fraction u of the agents stop at time zero whereas the rest stop
“immediately after” zero. This may illustrate why we have imposed
right-continuity in our results.
(iv) Supercritical interaction, c > 1. We see directly that ρ(t) = 1 is the
unique solution of (4.2) for all t ≥ 0.
4.1 On the Multiplicity of Equilibria
The following is a fairly well-behaved example of non-uniqueness.
Example 4.4. We consider again the setting of Example 4.3, with r = 1
and a(t) = t, say, but we now replace the uniform distribution of U i with a
measure that assigns mass ε ∈ (0, 1/4) uniformly to [0, ε] and to [1−ε, 1], and
the remaining mass 1− 2ε uniformly to [1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε]. For small enough
ε > 0 and c ∈ (0, 1), we see that Equation (4.1) has three interior solutions
for t within a certain interval, whereas all solutions are at the origin for t = 0.
We can select any of these solutions to form an increasing right-continuous
process ρ that corresponds to a legitimate equilibrium.
To understand this bifurcation, let us first look at an even simpler situa-
tion where γit = r − c+ cρ(t) for all i. At time t = 0, two obvious equilibria
are: No agent stops, then ρ(t) = 0 and γit = r− c < r, so it is indeed optimal
not to stop. Or, all agents stop immediately, then ρ(t) = 1 and γit = r, so it
is indeed optimal to stop. (This coordination problem is very similar to the
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phenomenon discussed e.g. in [14, 27].) When γit is random, a similar choice
can arise at an intermediate time for a subset of the population correspond-
ing to an atom in the distribution of γi. More generally, the bifurcation can
also happen in a continuous fashion when the random variable is sufficiently
concentrated (relative to the size of c) around some point rather than having
atoms, and this is what was witnessed in Example 4.4.
The following observation is a different view on the same interplay.
Remark 4.5. Let (t, y) 7→ Ft(y) be C
1 and write ft = ∂yFt for the proba-
bility density at time t. Suppose that ∂uFt(r − cu) 6= −1; that is,
cft(r − cu) 6= 1
for u in a neighborhood of a solution ρ(t) of (4.1). Then, the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem shows that ρ is locally unique and C1. For c > 0, this is true,
in particular, if 0 ≤ ft < c
−1 on [r − c, r]. Or, put differently: if Ft is not
too concentrated or if c is small enough, local uniqueness holds.
The following provides a broader perspective on Example 2.4 and shows
that uniqueness may fail even more dramatically in certain regimes.
Example 4.6. We consider again the setting of Example 4.3, except that
we now take
a(t) =
{
0, t < T
2, t ≥ T,
where T ∈ (0,∞) acts as a time horizon. Indeed, this definition implies
γit ≥ r + 1 for all t ≥ T and i ∈ I, so that all agents will stop at T , if not
earlier.
Thus, we are interested in the situation on [0, T ), where (4.2) becomes
1− u = F (1− cu).
(i) For c ∈ [0, 1), the unique solution is u = 0, and thus
ρ(t) = 1[T,∞)
is the corresponding equilibrium: at t = 0, only a nullset of agents stop, and
that does not change until T . One can check that this equilibrium is unique,
even though γi is not strictly increasing.
(ii) At the critical value c = 1, uniqueness is lost and the situation is
completely different. Indeed, the equation becomes the tautological 1− u =
15
1 − u. Thus, any right-continuous, increasing function X(t) with values in
[0, 1] determines an equilibrium via
ρ(t) = X(t)1[0,T ) + 1[T,∞).
This is the situation we have encountered in Example 2.4: in terms of the
equilibrium distribution, there is equivalence between assigning risk aversion
r−i to agent i and sampling uniformly from [r−1, r] for every agent as in the
present example. The latter basically corresponds to randomly permuting
the labels of the agents in Example 2.4.
5 The General Model
In this section, we generalize the model from the previous section by specify-
ing the intensities γi as a possibly nonlinear function of i.i.d. signals Y i and a
common signal X. As a result, the intensities are conditionally independent
rather than independent, and the equilibrium becomes a function of X.
As above, we consider the setup introduced in Section 2 with atomless
probability spaces (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ), and let (I × Ω,Σ, µ) be a Fubini
extension of their product. For each i ∈ I, let Y i ≥ 0 be a right-continuous,
increasing, Gi-progressively measurable process. We assume that for each
t ≥ 0, (i, ω) 7→ Y it (ω) is Σ-measurable and that Y
i
t , i ∈ I are essentially
pairwise i.i.d. Moreover, we assume that the distribution of Y it has no atoms;
that is, its c.d.f. y 7→ Ft(y) := P{Y
i
t ≤ y} is continuous. In addition, let
X be a d-dimensional, right-continuous, (componentwise) increasing process
which is Gi-progressively measurable for all i and such that Xt and Y
i
t are
independent for all t ≥ 0. Thus, X is interpreted as public information
whereas Y i is a private signal7 available only to agent i. (A slightly different
setup and interpretation are discussed in Section 5.1.)
Let r : R+ × R
d → R be a right-continuous, decreasing function. The
interest rate process will be assumed to be of the form8
rt = r(t,Xt).
Finally, the intensity of agent i will be of the form γit = g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , ρt), where
g : R+ × R
d × R× [0, 1] → R
7 Additional idiosyncratic signals could also be included. In particular, a signal at time
zero can be used to assign different functional forms of γi to the agents, similarly as at
the end of Example 4.3.
8 Since X can be multivariate, this entails no loss of generality relative to introducing
yet another stochastic process.
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is a continuous function with g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , 0) ≥ 0, increasing in all its ar-
guments and such that for all (t, x, u), y 7→ g(t, x, y, u) admits an inverse
y′ 7→ g−1(t, x, y′, u) on its range which we assume to be R for simplicity. We
suppose that g−1 is again continuous.
Theorem 5.1. The equation
1− u = Ft(g
−1(t, x, r, u)), u ∈ [0, 1] (5.1)
has a maximal solution ρ(t, x, r) ∈ [0, 1] for every (t, x, r) ∈ R+ × R
d × R,
and ρt := ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)) is a right-continuous, increasing process. Define
also
γit = g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , ρt), τ
i = inf{t : γit = rt}
and assume that (2.1) is satisfied for all i.
(i) Then, ρ and (τ i)i∈I define an equilibrium: τ
i ∈ T i is an optimal
stopping time for agent i, the mapping (i, ω) 7→ τ i(ω) is Σ-measurable, and
λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = ρt P -a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
More generally, this holds for any measurable solution ρ(t, x, r) of (5.1) such
that ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)) is right-continuous and increasing.
(ii) Conversely, let t 7→ ρ¯t be a right-continuous process corresponding
to an equilibrium and suppose that ρ¯t = ρ¯(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)) for some measur-
able function ρ¯. If γi is strictly increasing for all i, then for every t ≥ 0,
ρ¯(t, x, r(t, x)) solves (5.1) for (P ◦X−1t )-almost all x ∈ R
d.
Proof. (a) We claim that ρ(t, x, r) is well-defined, increasing in (t, x) and
decreasing in r, and (jointly) right-continuous in (t, x) and left-continuous
in r. Indeed, fix (t, x, r) and consider the function
Gt,x,r(u) := Ft(g
−1(t, x, r, u)) − 1 + u, u ∈ [0, 1].
Since Ft takes values in [0, 1], we have Gt,x,r(0) ≤ 0 and Gt,x,r(1) ≥ 0. As
u 7→ Gt,x,r(u) is continuous, it follows that there is least one zero in [0, 1],
and since the set of all zeros is compact, it has a maximum.
We write ρ(t, x, r) for the maximal zero of Gt,x,r. As Y is increasing, the
function t 7→ Ft(y) is decreasing and then so is t 7→ Gt,x,r(u); note that g
−1
is decreasing in (t, x, u) and increasing in r. Hence, if s ≤ t, the fact that
Gt,x,r > 0 on (ρ(t, x, r), 1] implies that Gs,x,r > 0 on (ρ(t, x, r), 1] and hence
that ρ(s, x, r) ≤ ρ(t, x, r). The monotonicity in x and r follows analogously.
Let tn ↓ t and xn ↓ x and rn ↑ r. Set ρn = ρ(tn, xn, rn) and ρ∗ = ρ(t, x, r).
By the above, ρn is decreasing and ρn ≥ ρ∗. Thus, we only need to verify
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that ρ∞ := lim ρn ≤ ρ∗. In view of the definition of ρ∗ as a maximal zero,
it suffices to show that ρ∞ is a zero of Gt,x,r, and as Gtn,xn,rn(ρn) = 0, that
will follow if
(t, x,−r, u) 7→ Gt,x,r(u) is jointly right-continuous. (5.2)
Indeed, y 7→ Ft(y) is continuous, and together with the right-continuity
of Y , it follows that t 7→ Ft(y) is right-continuous. Using also the continuity
of g−1, we see that (5.2) holds as desired. This completes the proof of the
claim on ρ.
(b) Next, we verify the equilibrium conditions. As a result of (a), the pro-
cesses t 7→ ρt = ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)) and γ
i are increasing and right-continuous,
and Lemma 2.1 yields that τ i ∈ T i is an optimal stopping time. Note
that (i, ω) 7→ γi(ω) is Σ-measurable, and so is (i, ω) 7→ rt(ω). Thus,
{τ i ≤ t} = {γi ≥ rt} ∈ Σ for all t ≥ 0. Using the Conditional Exact
Law of Large Numbers of Proposition 3.4, the continuity of y 7→ Ft(y) and
the definition of ρt, we have P -a.s. that
ρ¯t := λ{i : τ
i ≤ t} = λ{i : g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt))) ≥ r(t,Xt)}
=
∫
P{g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt))) ≥ r(t,Xt)|Xt}λ(di)
= 1− Ft(g
−1(t,Xt, r(t,Xt), ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt))))
= ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)) = ρt.
(c) Let ρ¯ be a right-continuous process corresponding to an equilibrium;
that is, ρ¯t = λ{i : τ
i ≤ t} for some optimal τ i ∈ T i. Then ρ¯ is clearly
increasing and [0, 1]-valued. Due to the strict increase of γi, we know from
Lemma 2.1 that τ i = inf{t : γit ≥ rt}, which also ensures that {τ
i ≤ t} ∈ Σ.
Since we have assumed that ρ¯t = ρ¯(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)), we obtain as in (b) that
ρ¯t = λ{i : τ
i ≤ t} = 1− Ft(g
−1(t,Xt, r(t,Xt), ρ¯(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)))) P -a.s.
for all t ≥ 0.
Remark 5.2. The result in Theorem 5.1 (ii) assumes a priori that the equi-
librium ρ¯t is Markovian; that is, a deterministic function of (t,Xt).
(i) First, let us observe that this is not automatically the case: random-
ized equilibria may exist. Consider the setting of Example 4.4 where X is
deterministic and Equation (5.1) has several (deterministic, increasing, right-
continuous) solutions; in particular, a maximal solution ρ(t) and a minimal
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solution ρ′(t). Suppose that there is a Poisson process N which is Gi-adapted
and independent of Y i for all i, and let σ be its first jump time. Then,
ρ¯t = 1[0,σ)(t)ρ
′(t) + 1[σ,∞)(t)ρ(t)
defines another right-continuous, increasing solution of (5.1) which deter-
mines an equilibrium. However, ρ¯t is not of the mentioned Markovian form.
Instead, the agents can agree to change their behavior according to the in-
dependent randomization σ. We also refer to [10, 22] for further insights
on randomized (or “weak”) equilibria in the context of standard mean field
games.
(ii) Second, let us show that the phenomenon mentioned in (i) cannot
occur if uniqueness holds in Equation (5.1). In the setting of Theorem 5.1 (ii),
even if we do not suppose a priori that ρ¯ is a function of (t,Xt), we have
ρ¯t = λ{i : τ
i ≤ t} = λ{i : g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , ρ¯t) ≥ r(t,Xt)}
=
∫
P{g(t,Xt, Y
i
t , ρ¯t) ≥ r(t,Xt)|Xt}λ(di)
= 1− Ft(g
−1(t,Xt, r(t,Xt), ρ¯t)).
If ρ(t, x, r) is the maximal solution of (5.1) as constructed in the theorem
and uniqueness holds for (5.1), it follows that
ρ¯t = ρ(t,Xt, r(t,Xt)) P -a.s.
and in that sense, ρ¯ is necessarily of the Markovian form.
Remark 5.3. In the literature on mean field games driven by stochastic
differential equations, the private states at time t are usually independent
conditionally on the whole path (Xs)s≤t of the common noise before time t.
In the present setting, we have assumed that the intensities γi depend on X
in a Markovian way, and hence it is sufficient to condition on the current
value Xt. One could envision a similar result where γ
i depends on X in a
path-dependent way, and then one would condition on the whole past of X.
5.1 Additive Model and Noisy Observations
In this section, we enhance the toy model from Proposition 4.1 by incor-
porating a public signal and obtain a tractable specification of the general
model from Theorem 5.1. Consider the setup introduced in Section 2 with
atomless probability spaces (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ), and let (I × Ω,Σ, µ) be
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a Fubini extension of their product. For each i ∈ I, let Y i ≥ 0 be a right-
continuous, increasing, measurable process. We assume that for each t ≥ 0,
(i, ω) 7→ Y it (ω) is Σ-measurable and that Y
i
t , i ∈ I are essentially pairwise
independent. Moreover, we assume that the distribution of Y it (·) has no
atoms; that is, its c.d.f. Ft is continuous. Furthermore, let X ≥ 0 be a
right-continuous, increasing, measurable process such that Xt and Y
i
t are
independent for all t ≥ 0. We take r ∈ R to be constant (for simplicity) and
γit = Xt + Y
i
t + cρt,
where c ≥ 0 is a constant governing the strength of interaction; see also
Example 4.3. For the information structure, we may consider two cases.
Either we see Gi as given and assume that
• X and Y i are Gi-progressively measurable for all i ∈ I,
which was the point of view taken above. Or, we model that the agents
observe only X + Y i and ρ, and thus we convene that
• Gi is the right-continuous filtration generated by X +Y i and ρ, for all
i ∈ I.
This allows for the interpretation of X as a “true signal,” whereas agent i
can only observe the noisy signal X + Y i with i.i.d. noise Y i. Although
the agents have more information in the first setting, both yield the same
equilibria—the form of τ i stated below shows that the agents only use the
observation of γi. Indeed, Theorem 5.1 yields the following.
Corollary 5.4. The equation
1− u = Ft(r − x− cu), u ∈ [0, 1]
has a maximal solution ρ(t, x) ∈ [0, 1] for every (t, x) ∈ R+ × R, and ρt :=
ρ(t,Xt) is a right-continuous process. Define also
γit = Xt + Y
i
t + cρt, τ
i = inf{t : Xt + Y
i
t + cρt = r}
and assume that (2.1) is satisfied for all i.
(i) Then, ρ and (τ i)i∈I define an equilibrium: τ
i ∈ T i is an optimal
stopping time for agent i, the mapping (i, ω) 7→ τ i(ω) is Σ-measurable, and
λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = ρt P -a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
(ii) Conversely, let t 7→ ρ¯t be a right-continuous process corresponding to
an equilibrium and suppose that ρ¯t = ρ¯(t,Xt) for some measurable function
ρ¯. If γi is strictly increasing for all i, then for every t ≥ 0, ρ¯(t, x) solves (5.1)
for (P ◦X−1t )-almost all x ∈ R.
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A solvable example can be constructed along the lines of Example 4.3.
Example 5.5. Let r ≥ 1 and let U i, i ∈ I be essentially pairwise i.i.d. with
a uniform distribution on [r−1, r] and such that U i and Xt are independent
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, suppose that X is strictly increasing with X0 = 0
and X∞ > 1. For c ∈ (0, 1), consider the intensity process
γit = Xt + U
i + cρt.
Then, the equation has a unique solution ρ(t, x), and
ρ(t,Xt) = [(1− c)
−1Xt] ∧ 1
corresponds to the unique (Markovian) equilibrium. In particular, this equi-
librium evolves in a nondegenerate way as long as X does.
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